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Part II—Domestic Protections within a European Framework 
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Chapter 5 
 
Deconstructing the Mirror Principle 
 
Roger Masterman

 
 
Introduction 
Despite lacking a clear heritage in the provisions of the Human Rights Act (hereafter HRA),
1
 
the “mirror principle”—the broad notion that domestic human rights protections under the 
HRA should replicate the protections afforded to those same rights by the European Court of 
Human Rights—has been a pervasive influence on the judicial interpretation, and application, 
of the Act.
2
  The mirror metaphor captures a number of distinct strands of judicial reasoning 
in rights cases.  First, it speaks to the approach taken by courts seeking to determine how the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence should be ‘taken into account’ and thereby translated into domestic 
law under the “flexible” terminology of s.2(1) HRA;3 with the judicial suggestion that “clear 
and constant” jurisprudence of the Strasbourg organs should generally be “followed”4 
bringing a degree of predictability to the broad discretion available to courts under that 
                                                 

 My thanks are due to Merris Amos, David Mead, Gavin Phillipson and Alison Young for their comments on a 
draft.  Any errors and omissions are, of course, my own.   
1
 Section 2(1) HRA provides: “A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a 
Convention right must take into account any—(a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the 
European Court of Human Rights, (b) opinion of the Commission given in a report adopted under Article 31 of 
the Convention, (c) decision of the Commission in connection with Article 26 or 27(2) of the Convention, or (d) 
decision of the Committee of Ministers taken under Article 46 of the Convention, whenever made or given, so 
far as, in the opinion of the court or tribunal, it is relevant to the proceedings in which that question has arisen.” 
2
 The phrase “mirror principle” is Jonathan Lewis’: J. Lewis, “The European Ceiling on Rights” [2007] P.L. 
720.  See also: R. Masterman, “Aspiration or Foundation? The Status of the Strasbourg Jurisprudence and the 
‘Convention Rights’ in Domestic Law” in H. Fenwick, G. Phillipson and R. Masterman (eds), Judicial 
Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); J. Beatson, S. 
Grosz, T. Hickman, R. Singh and S. Palmer, Human Rights: Judicial Protection in the United Kingdom 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2008), pp.40-45.   
3
 S. Tierney, “Devolution Issues and s.2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998” [2000] E.H.R.L.R. 380, 392.   
4
 R. (on the application of Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport 
and the Regions [2003] 2 A.C. 295 at [26] (Lord Slynn of Hadley); R. (on the application of Anderson) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 1 A.C. 836 at [10] (Lord Bingham).   
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provision.  Secondly, the mirror principle concerns the range and scope of the rights protected 
under the HRA,
5
 with the injunction that domestic courts seek to provide “no more, but 
certainly no less”6 protection than would be provided by the Strasbourg court itself seeming 
to curb the ability of domestic courts to extend (or reduce) the scope of the protections 
provided by “the Convention Rights” beyond that countenanced by the European Court of 
Human Rights.  Finally, the mirror model of interpretation provides a lens through which the 
entire remedial structure of the HRA can be viewed, giving rise to the suggestion that the Act 
is no more than a cipher through which the rights and remedies which would otherwise be 
available only at Strasbourg are duplicated in domestic law.
7
   
 At the level of individual decision-making the mirror principle holds the potential to 
wield a regulating influence over the exercise of judicial discretion in HRA adjudication, 
limiting the scope for domestic courts to depart from Strasbourg authority and the breadth of 
those rights afforded protection.  At the constitutional level, the principle facilitates access to 
the Strasbourg level of protection in domestic courts, but—through the denial of a distinctly 
domestic content to rights protections under the HRA—impedes the ability of the HRA to 
operate as a proto-Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom.
8
  The mirror principle aspires to 
both descriptive and normative characteristics; it is at once an encapsulation of what many 
courts have done in seeking to reconcile domestic law with the demands of the Convention 
Rights under s.2(1), and for many—in the wider debate over the constitutional purpose of the 
HRA—a prescription of what the courts should do in order to give effect to the Act as a 
whole. 
 Yet in reality, the inflexible relationship between “the Convention Rights” as given 
effect under the HRA and those rights as policed by the European Court of Human Rights 
that is at the heart of the mirror principle—strictly construed—is neither a requirement of the 
HRA itself, nor of the Convention: s.2(1) HRA requires only that domestic courts “take into 
account” relevant Strasbourg authority in determining questions relating to the Convention 
                                                 
5
 Human Rights Act 1998, s.1(1).   
6
 R. (on the application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator; Do v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2004] UKHL 26; 
[2004] 2 A.C. 323 at [20] (Lord Bingham). 
7
 R. (on the application of Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58; [2008] 1 A.C. 332 at 
[55] (Lord Rodger of Earlsferry); R. (on the application of Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh 
High School [2006] UKHL 15; [2007] 1 A.C. 100 at [29] (Lord Bingham).  
8
 F. Klug, “A Bill of Rights: Do we need on or do we already have one?” [2007] P.L. 701, 706-708.   
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Rights,
9
 while the application of the margin of appreciation by the Strasbourg court ensures 
that the uniform application of the Convention throughout the Council of Europe is ultimately 
an impossibility.
10
  In spite of the linguistic vagary of s.2(1),
11
 and the difficulties associated 
with using the Strasbourg case-law as a blueprint for a national rights jurisprudence,
12
 the 
prevailing judicial approach to the interpretation of s.2(1) HRA during the first ten years of 
its operation can be stated succinctly: “[f]ollowing Strasbourg will be the norm and departing 
from it will be the exception.”13   
In the early years of the HRA’s operation, indications were given that domestic courts 
might depart from potentially applicable Strasbourg authority where it could be shown that 
the European Court had “misunderstood” the relevant domestic law,14 where the Strasbourg 
organs had received insufficient guidance on the point in question to form a conclusion
15
 or 
where application of the relevant authority would “compel a conclusion fundamentally at 
odds with the distribution of powers under the British constitution.”16  Actual exceptions to 
the general presumption in favour of adherence to Strasbourg authority were more difficult to 
find;
17
 at least one commentator was able to suggest, in research published in 2007, that so 
few were the occasions on which the courts had distinguished or departed from relevant 
Strasbourg authority the supposed exceptions to the mirror principle existed in theory alone.
18
  
The weight of evidence in favour of a dilution of the mirror principle has since steadily 
grown.  In a series of cases concerning the impact of Article 8 on possession proceedings, the 
                                                 
9
 An amendment which would have seen courts bound to adhere to Strasbourg decisions was tabled, and 
rejected, during the parliamentary progress of the Human Rights Bill (HL Debs, Vol.000, Col.514, 18 
November 1997).    
10
 Handyside v United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 737 at [48].   
11
 Cf. Lord Irvine of Lairg, “A British Interpretation of Convention Rights” [2012] P.L. 237, 238-239: “The 
terms of this provision are simple … The meaning of the provision is clear.”   
12
 On which see: R. Masterman, “Taking the Strasbourg Jurisprudence into Account: developing a “municipal 
law of human rights” under the Human Rights Act” (2005) 54 I.C.L.Q. 907, 915-918.   
13
 A. Kavanagh, “Special Advocates, Control Orders and the Right to a Fair Trial” (2010) 73 M.L.R. 836, 845.   
14
 R. v Lyons (No.3) [2002] UKHL 44, [2003] 1 A.C. 976 at [46] (Lord Hoffmann).  
15
 R. v Spear [2002] UKHL 31; [2003] 1 A.C. 734 at [12] (Lord Bingham).   
16
  R. (on the application of Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport 
and the Regions [2003] 2 A.C. 295 at [76] (Lord Hoffmann).   
17
 R. Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998: Binding Domestic Courts to Strasbourg?’ [2004] 
P.L. 725.   
18
 J. Lewis, “The European Ceiling on Rights” [2007] P.L. 720, 731.   
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ability of domestic courts to engage in a “creative dialogue”19 with the European Court on the 
meanings of the rights protected by the HRA has been amply demonstrated.
20
  The House of 
Lords decision in Re P demonstrates that in those areas in which the European Court has held 
the margin of appreciation to apply the mirror metaphor cannot coherently operate: “the 
question is one for the national authorities to decide for themselves”21 in accordance with the 
principles underpinning the relevant Convention rights(s) and informed by what authority is 
discernable from the Strasbourg case-law.  Most strikingly, the decision of the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court in R. v Horncastle provides perhaps the most compelling authority 
to date for the suggestion that domestic courts will not simply apply even relevant and clear 
Strasbourg case-law as a matter of course, and in so doing provides further implicit support 
for the suggestion that in their meaning and application, the domesticated Convention Rights 
might well deviate from their Strasbourg cousins.
22
   
But these decisions by no means mark the complete abandonment of the mirror 
principle as either a constraint on the scope of the rights protected under the HRA, or as a 
factor governing judicial interpretation of the overall HRA scheme.
23
  The notion that the 
domestic court acting pursuant to the HRA does so as a local proxy for the European Court of 
Human Rights runs deep.  As a result the presumption that the “clear and constant” 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg organs should ordinarily be followed continues to resonate in 
UK Supreme Court decisions.
24
  So too does the suggestion that courts should not afford a 
                                                 
19
 Lord Steyn, “2000-2005: Laying the foundations of human rights law in the United Kingdom” [2005] 
E.H.R.L.R. 349, 361.  See also the chapter by Merris Amos in this volume.   
20
 The relevant domestic authorities are: Harrow LBC v Qazi [2003] UKHL 43; [2004] 1 A.C. 983; Kay v 
Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL 10; [2006] 2 A.C. 465; Doherty v Birmingham CC [2008] UKHL 57; [2009] 1 
A.C. 367; Manchester CC v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45.  The relevant European Court of Human Rights 
decisions are: Connors v United Kingdom (2004) 40 EHRR 189; McCann v United Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 
913; Kay v United Kingdom, Application No.37341/06 (21 September 2010).  For discussion see: I. Loveland, 
“The shifting sands of Article 8 jurisprudence in English housing law” [2011] E.H.R.L.R. 151.   
21
 In Re P [2008] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 A.C. 173 at [31] (Lord Hoffmann).  On which see: J. Lewis, “In Re P and 
others: an exception to the ‘no more, certainly no less’ rule” [2009] P.L. 43.  
22
 R. v Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14; [2010] 2 A.C. 373.  See now: Al-Khawaja v United Kingdom (2012) 54 
E.H.R.R. 23.   
23
 T. Cross and C. Knight, “Public Law in the Supreme Court 2009-2010” (2010) 15 J.R. 299, 301.  Cf. J. 
Wright, “Interpreting section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998: towards an indigenous jurisprudence of human 
rights” [2009] P.L. 595.   
24
 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2010] 3 W.L.R. 1441 at [48] (Lord Neuberger of 
Abbotsbury MR): “Where … there is a clear and constant line of decisions whose effect is not inconsistent with 
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more generous interpretation of “the Convention Rights” domestically than that afforded by 
the European Court of Human Rights.
25
  It follows that the sentiments expressed by Lord 
Rodger of Earlsferry in the House of Lords decision in Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v AF— “[e]ven though we are dealing with rights under a United Kingdom 
statute, in reality, we have no choice: Argentoratum locutum, iudicium finitum—Strasbourg 
has spoken, the case is closed”26 —have by no means been erased from history.    
 This chapter questions the continuing utility of the mirror principle as a guiding 
interpretative tool, arguing that it can increasingly be seen to provide an inadequate account 
of judicial practice under the HRA and—more fundamentally—that it provides an unstable 
normative foundation for the shape and content of the HRA’s rights jurisprudence.   
 
The Origins of the Mirror Principle 
The origins of the mirror principle lie in the unclear status of “the Convention rights” as legal 
standards in the domestic context.
27
  This uncertainty is traceable to the fact that while the 
HRA itself is a creation of the United Kingdom Parliament, its implications cannot be fully 
appreciated without reference to the international treaty (and its attendant case-law) to which 
the Act was designed to give “further effect.”  As a result, the Convention standards enjoy a 
split personality; they are at once enforceable in domestic law under the provisions of the 
HRA, and standards of international law by which the conduct of the United Kingdom, as a 
state party to the European Convention on Human Rights, can be assessed.
28
  
                                                                                                                                                        
some fundamental substantive or procedural aspect of our law, and whose reasoning does not appear to overlook 
or misunderstand some argument or point of principle, we consider that it would be wrong for this court not to 
follow that line.”  See also: Cadder v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43; [2010] 1 W.L.R. 2601 at [45]-[51] (Lord 
Hope of Craighead).   
25
 Ali v Birmingham City Council [2010] UKSC 8; [2010] 2 A.C. 39 at [38] (Lord Hope); HM Treasury v Ahmed 
[2010] UKSC 5; [2010] 2 A.C. 534 at [74] (Lord Hope); Ambrose v Harris [2011] UKSC 43 at [17]-[20] (Lord 
Hope) (Cf. at [126]-[130] (Lord Kerr).     
26
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No.3) [2009] UKHL 28; [2010] 2 A.C. 269 at [98] (Lord 
Rodger of Earlsferry).  For a specific analysis of the role of s.2(1) HRA to this case see: A. Kavanagh, “Special 
Advocates, Control Orders and the Right to a Fair Trial” (2010) 73 M.L.R. 836, 843-847.   
27
 For a detailed discussion of the uncertain constitutional status of the HRA itself see: T. Hickman, Public Law 
after the Human Rights Act (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), pp.24-49.   
28
 See: A. Kavanagh, “Strasbourg, the House of Lords or Elected Politicians: who decides about rights after Re 
P?” (2009) 72 M.L.R. 828, 834-836.  
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While s.2(1) of the Act directs that courts to “take into account” decisions of the 
Strasbourg organs when “determining a question which has arisen in connection with a 
Convention right,” it gives no guidance as to the weight—precedential, persuasive or 
otherwise—to be attributed to those decisions in HRA adjudication.  The text of the HRA 
lends support to the view that the meanings given to “the Convention Rights” in the domestic 
context cannot be completely divorced from the meanings attributed to those rights by the 
Strasbourg Court— “the Convention Rights” provide the legal standards against which 
statutes and public authority activities are to be tested
29—but it by no means follows that the 
application of the HRA is inescapably and inflexibly tied to only the meanings of the 
Convention articulated by the Strasbourg bodies.
30
  The HRA clearly contains meaning that 
is—and should be—entirely independent of the requirements of the rights to which it gives 
further effect.   
In giving effect to “the Convention Rights” under the HRA, the interpretational 
difficulty faced by domestic courts therefore lies in the question of whether the nature of 
those rights as they apply in the domestic context differs in any way from those rights as 
enforced by the European Court of Human Rights.  Do the Convention Rights as applied 
under the Human Rights Act possess the exact same characteristics in domestic law as they 
would when applied by the Strasbourg court?  Or has their transition into the domestic 
context—via the HRA—altered those characteristics in some way?  Responses to these 
questions are central to understanding the HRA, and have manifested themselves across a 
spectrum of judicial opinion under which the HRA is variously viewed as a conduit through 
which those rights available to applicants at Strasbourg can be realised in domestic law,
31
 as a 
mechanism which seeks to blend Convention and common law protections for rights
32
 and as 
an instrument which has created anew a distinctly domestic species of legal rights.
33
   
                                                 
29
 Sections 3(1) and 6(1) HRA 1998.   
30
 As Lord Irvine argued during the parliamentary debates on the Human Rights Bill, “our courts must be free to 
try to give a lead to Europe as well as to be led” (HL Debs, vol.583, col.514 (18 November 1997).   
31
 For example: R. (on the application of Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58; [2008] 1 
A.C. 332 at [55] (Lord Rodger of Earlsferry); R. (on the application of Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of 
Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15; [2007] 1 A.C. 100 at [29] (Lord Bingham). 
32
 For example: Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [2002] 2 All ER 668 at [17] (Laws  
LJ): “… the court’s task under the HRA … is not simply to add on the Strasbourg learning to the corpus of 
English law, as if it were a compulsory adjunct taken from an alien source, but to develop a municipal law of 
human rights by the incremental method of the common law, case by case, taking account of the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence as HRA s.2 enjoins us to do.”   
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The dominant approach towards the construction and application of s.2(1) HRA has 
tended towards the conservative end of that spectrum, displaying a clear hesitance on the part 
of the courts to find meaning in the domesticated “Convention Rights” that cannot be traced 
back to their Strasbourg counterparts.  Domestic courts have—for the most part—taken their 
lead from, and have been reluctant to exceed, the protections afforded by the European Court 
of Human Rights.  The origins of this incorporationist approach can be found in the speech of 
Lord Slynn in the House of Lords decision in Alconbury.
34
  In that decision, Slynn indicated 
that “in the absence of some special circumstances … clear and constant jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights”35 should be followed, and, in so doing, effectively 
established a rebuttable presumption in favour of applying relevant Strasbourg case-law in 
HRA decision-making.
36
   
If Alconbury confirmed that domestic case-law should mirror its Strasbourg 
counterpart, then the decision of the House of Lords in R. (on the application of Ullah) v 
Special Adjudicator extended that approach to the scope of the substantive protections 
afforded under the HRA.  While, in a now famous passage, Lord Bingham was prepared to 
countenance departure from Strasbourg jurisprudence, the end result of such a course of 
action should not—he stressed—result in the expansion (or indeed reduction) by the courts of 
protections afforded at the domestic level.  Lord Bingham argued:  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
33
 For example: R. (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport [2008] 
UKHL 15; [2008] 1 A.C. 1312 at [44]-[45] (Lord Scott); In Re McKerr [2004] UKHL 12 at [65] (Lord 
Hoffmann): “Although people sometimes speak of the Convention having been incorporated into domestic law, 
that is a misleading metaphor.  What the Act has done is to create domestic rights in the same terms as those 
contained in the Convention.  But they are domestic rights, not international rights.  Their source is the statute, 
not the Convention … their meaning and application is a matter for domestic courts, not the court in 
Strasbourg.” 
34
 R. (on the application of Alconbury Developments and others) v Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions [2001] UKHL 23; [2003] 2 A.C. 295.    
35
 R. (on the application of Alconbury Developments and others) v Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions [2001] UKHL 23; [2003] 2 A.C. 295 at [26] (Lord Slynn).  See also: R. (on the 
application of Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKHL 46; [2003] 1 A.C. 837, at 
[18] (Lord Bingham); R. (on the application of Amin) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 
UKHL 51; [2004] 1 A.C. 653 at [44] (Lord Slynn).    
36
 A. Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), p.146.   
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… a national court subject to a duty such as that imposed by section 2 should not  
without strong reason dilute or weaken the effect of the Strasbourg case law.  It is 
indeed unlawful under section 6 of the 1998 Act for a public authority, including a 
court, to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention Right.  It is of course 
open to member states to provide for rights more generous than those guaranteed by 
the Convention, but such provision should not be the product of interpretation of the 
Convention by national courts, since the meaning of the Convention should be 
uniform throughout the states party to it.  The duty of national courts is to keep pace 
with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time: no more, but certainly no 
less.
37
  
 
The cumulative effect of the “clear and constant” and “no more, but certainly no less” lines of 
reasoning is to attempt to provide structure to the discretion available to courts when 
considering the precedential force of Strasbourg decisions, and to place limitations on the 
scope of the protections that might be afforded to “the Convention Rights” under the HRA.  
Both strands of reasoning—that domestic courts should generally apply both Strasbourg 
case-law and Strasbourg standards—are consistent with a broader reading of the HRA which 
posits that the primary function of the Act is to make accessible in domestic courts only the 
rights and remedies which would otherwise be available to applicants at the Strasbourg 
level.
38
   
In its “wider application,”39 therefore, the mirror metaphor is argued to extend to the 
interpretation of the HRA as a whole.  In R. v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Quark Fishing, Lord Nicholls suggested that the combined 
effect of ss.6 and 7 HRA was to “mirror in domestic law the treaty obligations of the United 
                                                 
37
 R. (on the application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator; Do v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2004] UKHL 26; 
[2004] 2 A.C. 323 at [20] (Lord Bingham).   
38
 R. (on the application of Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15; 
[2007] 1 A.C. 100 at [29].  See also: R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Greenfield 
[2005] UKHL 14; [2005] 1 W.L.R. 673 at [19] (Lord Bingham); R. (on the application of Quark Fishing Ltd) v 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2005] UKHL 57; [2006] 1 A.C. 529 at  [24] (Lord 
Bingham) at [34] (Lord Nicholls); at [88] (Lord Hope); Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2007] UKHL 11; [2007] 2 A.C. 167 at [8].   
39
 In Re G (Adoption: Unmarried Couple) [2008] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 A.C. 173 at [79] (Lord Walker of 
Gestingthorpe).   
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Kingdom in respect of the corresponding articles of the Convention and its protocols.”40  
Drawing support from the views of Lord Hope in Wallbank,
41
 he continued:  
 
The [Human Rights] Act was intended to provide a domestic remedy where a remedy 
would have been available in Strasbourg.  Conversely, the Act was not intended to 
provide a domestic remedy where a remedy would not have been available in 
Strasbourg.
 42
 
 
In Al-Jedda, Lord Rodger appeared to broadly agree, noting that the task of the domestic 
court operating under the HRA was to “assess how a claim by the appellant … would fare 
before the European Court of Human Rights.”43  Both perspectives arguably minimise the 
distinctively domestic aspects of the HRA, viewing the Act as an instrument enabling access 
to rights and remedies which would in its absence only be available through recourse to 
Strasbourg.  In cases such as Quark and Al-Jedda, in which the territorial integrity of the 
Convention—a matter falling within the clear competence of the European Court of Human 
Rights—was at issue, such an approach is entirely defensible.  But it by no means follows 
that the same considerations should apply in determining the reach of “the Convention rights” 
given specific effect by the HRA.  Extending the mirror metaphor so that it holds the 
potential to exert influence over the entire substantive and remedial structure put in place by 
the HRA, elevates the principle to the status of a virtual tenet of constitutional interpretation.  
On this reading, the HRA functions not as a proto-Bill of Rights, but simply to span the gap 
between national law and those rights and remedies which would otherwise be enforced by 
                                                 
40
 R. (on the application of Quark Fishing Ltd) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
[2005] UKHL 57; [2006] 1 A.C. 529 at [34] (Lord Nicholls).   
41
 Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2004] 1 A.C. 546, 564, 
[44]: “… [the] purpose of … sections [6 and 7 HRA] is to provide a remedial structure in domestic law for the 
rights guaranteed in the Convention.” 
42
 R. (on the application of Quark Fishing Ltd) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
[2005] UKHL 57; [2006] 1 A.C. 529 at [34] (Lord Nicholls).  Lord Bingham, at [25], advanced a similar 
perspective, suggesting that “the purpose of the 1998 Act was not to enlarge the field of application of the 
Convention but to enable those subject to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom and able to establish violations 
by United Kingdom public authorities to present their claims in the domestic courts of this country and not only 
in Strasbourg.”   
43
 R. (on the application of Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58; [2008] 1 A.C. 332 at 
[55] (Lord Rodger).  
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the European Court of Human Rights.  Domestic courts, in turn, operate as local “agents or 
delegates of the ECHR”44 rather than autonomous constitutional actors changed with giving 
further effect to the Convention standards at the national level.     
 
The Merits of Reflection 
The mirror approach to the Strasbourg case-law and meanings of “the Convention rights” 
under the HRA can be defended on both pragmatic and constitutional grounds.  At a practical 
level, an adherence to the mirror principle brings clear benefits for litigants in HRA cases; the 
relatively stable relationship between the Strasbourg jurisprudence and domestic law that the 
mirror metaphor promotes not only displays respect for the findings of the Strasbourg court,
45
 
but also contributes to greater certainty for both victims of purported infringements and for 
public body respondents.  The principle dictates that clear, constant and relevant Strasbourg 
reasoning will generally be adopted, and applied, by a domestic court, and holds that public 
bodies should not be expected to uphold standards of rights protection that exceed those 
countenanced by the European Court of Human Rights.  The obligations to adhere to “clear 
and constant” jurisprudence, and to provide no higher (or lower) standard of protection than 
would be afforded at Strasbourg, therefore promote legal certainty at the domestic level, 
and—in providing a protection which does not fall below the Strasbourg baseline—reduce 
the potential for an applicant to appeal successfully to the European Court of Human Rights.   
 The mirror principle might also be defended on constitutional grounds.  From a 
judicial perspective, the arguments in favour of the mirror approach—given ongoing 
controversies over the counter-majoritarian nature of rights adjudication—are easily 
appreciated.  First, an adherence to the principle can be argued to empower domestic courts.  
By tying the development of “the Convention Rights” in national law as closely as possible to 
those rights as defined at Strasbourg, domestic courts legitimise their actions when, for 
instance, adopting “strained” interpretations or reading in implied terms or additional words 
under s.3(1),
46
 or finding public body activity to have contravened the standards required by 
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the HRA.
47
  Relying on a variant of the doctrine of precedent, domestic courts are able to 
argue that utilising their powers to interpret legislation in such a way is effectively compelled 
by the findings of unequivocal Strasbourg authority.
48
   On the basis of such an approach 
courts are able to avoid accusations that the content of domestic human rights law is a 
product of overly imaginative judicial engineering, or rather less favourably, that it has 
simply been “made up.”49  As a result, one of the dangers of rights adjudication—that judges 
will compromise their independence through overt law-making—is avoided: firstly by 
adopting a “precedential” approach to the Convention jurisprudence,50 secondly by 
displaying a reluctance to attribute meaning to “the Convention rights” which does not find 
clear support in existing Strasbourg case-law.   
The mirror model is also arguably partially congruous with the constitutional division 
of labour between the three branches of government.  Consistently with the Labour 
Government’s intentions in implementing the HRA’s distinctive model of rights protection,51 
the mirror model respects parliamentary sovereignty through recognising only those rights 
specified by Parliament in the HRA and—in turn—only to the extent clearly provided for by 
the European Court of Human Rights.
52
  In its application, the mirror model therefore reflects 
the sovereignty-driven notion that Parliament—and not the courts—should be the appropriate 
                                                 
47
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49
 As suggested in: I. Loveland, “Making it up as they go along? The Court of Appeal on same-sex spouses and 
succession rights to tenancies” [2003] P.L. 222.  
50
 R. Masterman, “Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998: binding domestic courts to Strasbourg?” [2004] 
P.L. 725. 
51
 HL Debs, Vol.582, Col.1228, 3 November 1997 (Lord Irvine of Lairg QC); HC Debs, Vol.306, Col.772, 16 
February 1998 (Jack Straw MP).   
52
 Brown v Stott [2003] 1 A.C. 681, 703 (Lord Bingham).   
13 
 
author of legal frameworks of rights protection which extend, or are otherwise at variance 
with, the protections that would be afforded by the Strasbourg court.
53
  Yet it is at this point 
that the weaknesses of the mirror model also begin to become apparent; the uncodified 
constitution has long recognised the limited law-making role of the judiciary.
54
  The complete 
denial of even an incremental judicial law-making function (in the context of the meaning of 
“the Convention Rights” under the HRA) which would be the consequence of a rigid 
adherence to the mirror model is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the 
common law dimensions of the United Kingdom’s constitutional order.       
 
The Constitutional Deficiencies of the Mirror Model 
It is undoubted that the role of the domestic court under the HRA was—in part—to operate as 
a local proxy for the European Court of Human Rights, reducing the potential cost and delay 
associated with pursuing Convention-based litigation as far as Strasbourg.
55
  But to suggest 
that the role of the court was only to so act reflects a incomplete understanding of the 
intentions behind the HRA: indications were also given in Rights Brought Home that the 
purpose of the HRA would permit the Convention Rights to be “subtly and powerfully woven 
into our law” (rather than to supplant it) and would enable the judiciary to “make a 
distinctively British contribution to the development of the jurisprudence of human rights in 
Europe” (rather than to passively reflect it).56  In practice, the mirror model of interpretation 
oversimplifies the requirements of the both the Convention—a point that will be explored in 
more detail below—and of the HRA itself.  Three constitutional difficulties can be identified; 
the first relates to the structural requirements of HRA adjudication, the second to the dynamic 
relationship between national authorities and the European Convention organs, and the third 
to the judicial obligation to consider each case on its merits.        
As to the first of these, reasoning of the type seen in the House of Lords decisions in 
Quark and Al-Jedda—when deployed as a general principle applicable to the interpretation of 
                                                 
53
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the HRA
57—gives insufficient recognition to the fact that the HRA creates a remedial 
structure which cannot be coherently explained by reference to the Convention alone.  
Elements of this structure have no heritage in either the Convention itself or its case-law; the 
notion of hybrid public authorities
58
 and the declaration of incompatibility,
59
 for instance, are 
purely domestic concepts that go directly to the scope and extent of the protections afforded 
by the HRA.  The remedial capacity of the HRA is therefore as much a matter for domestic 
law as it is the Strasbourg jurisprudence: the approach of domestic courts to the boundary 
between legitimate statutory interpretation and impermissible amendment in the use of s.3(1) 
HRA, for instance, owes as much, or more, to local constitutional influences—the continuing 
relevance of the sovereignty doctrine and the fluctuating contours of the relationship between 
courts and Parliament—as it does to the strict requirements of the Convention as articulated 
by the Strasbourg court.  Interpretations of where the line between permissible interpretation, 
and illegitimate legislative amendment, will lie, will of course differ.  For the purposes of this 
particular argument, the precise point at which this line might be drawn is irrelevant; it is 
sufficient to acknowledge that concerns other than those originating in the Convention are 
material.  In short, determining the specific requirements of the HRA in the context of a 
particular case is an analytical exercise that is linked to—but distinctive from—a court’s 
assessment of the perceived requirements of the Convention.  The latter is relevant to the 
former, but only insofar as determining the meaning to be afforded to “the Convention 
Rights” in the domestic context.  The mirror model of interpretation conflates these two 
levels of analysis, treating the requirements of the Convention as being synonymous with 
those of the HRA itself. 
A further concern over the adoption by national courts of the mirror model of 
interpretation relates to the symbiotic relationship between national authorities and the 
Convention organs that is an expectation of the European Court of Human Rights.  While the 
mirror model may—in part at least—be premised on the assumption that Parliament, and not 
the courts, should be the ultimate guarantor of human rights standards in the domestic 
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context, this distinction is from the perspective of the Convention bodies, largely irrelevant;
60
 
the Convention is binding on the state.  As a result, it is at least arguable that “the ECHR’s 
injunction to further realise human rights and fundamental freedoms … is addressed to 
domestic courts” as well as legislatures.61  The tendency of national courts to mirror the 
findings of the European Court of Human Rights deprives the latter court of one of the key 
indicators of emerging consensus (or otherwise) among Convention signatories
62
 and is 
inconsistent with the fact that “the machinery of protection established by the Convention is 
subsidiary to [the protections afforded within] national systems.”63  A rigid adherence to the 
mirror approach to the application of the Convention jurisprudence therefore has the 
unintended consequence of distorting the dynamic nature of the relationship between the UK 
as a state party to the Convention and its governing court.  This danger has been recognised 
by the Supreme Court in Pinnock v Manchester City Council:  
 
This court is not bound to follow every decision of the European Court.  Not only 
would it be impractical to do so: it would sometimes be inappropriate, as it would 
destroy the ability of the court to engage in the constructive dialogue with the 
European Court which is of value to the development of the Convention law …64 
 
A precedent-like approach to the Strasbourg case-law undermines the upward influence of 
national courts in this dialogue, and gives credence to the suggestion that the Convention 
standards are European impositions—rather than the product of a collaborative exercise 
between national and supra national institutions—in so doing.     
Finally, the application of any overriding principle which seeks to mirror liability 
under the Convention in the domestic context—that is, an approach which holds the potential 
to displace context-specific analysis of the relevancy and applicability of the available 
                                                 
60
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Strasbourg case-law—will be susceptible to the same arguments that have been levelled 
against the perceived operation of a doctrine of deference in HRA adjudication.  The 
accusation that courts might allow their judgment on human rights issues to be displaced by 
the generation of a doctrinal approach to deference—under which the independent decision-
making capability of the courts is surrendered in acknowledgement of the supposedly 
superior credentials of the primary decision maker
65—finds a parallel in the suggestion that 
the purpose of the HRA is to replicate protections that would otherwise be enforced by the 
European Court of Human Rights.  The effect of the mirror principle is that the obligation of 
the court to consider the case before it, and available authority, on its merits is constrained by 
the overriding concern to mimic the Strasbourg standards in the domestic context.  As Lord 
Irvine has argued, “[s]ection 2 of the HRA means that is is our judges’ duty to decide the 
cases for themselves”66 rather than to defer to the expertise, or authority, of a supposedly 
superior decision-maker.  The exceptions that exist to the requirements imposed by the mirror 
principle may weaken this particular line of attack, but only insofar as the mirror metaphor 
extends to questions of the precedential force of Strasbourg authority.  The restraints placed 
on the scope of the protections afforded under the HRA, and the extension of the mirror 
metaphor to the interpretation of the HRA scheme as a whole, both continue to operate as 
external constraints on the discretion of courts that find little—at best only partial—support 
in the text of the HRA itself.   
As Tom Hickman has observed, the mirror model of interpreting the HRA has 
“crystallised into a powerful principle of purposive construction that has greatly influenced 
the Act’s interpretation and effect.”67  Yet, the overarching approach advocated by the mirror 
model is based on but one of the motivating factors behind the enactment of the HRA.  It can 
offer only an inadequate account of the overall constitutional purpose of the Act, and is 
therefore of dubious authority when (occasionally) presented as an authoritative statement of 
the Act’s objectives.  In addition, it holds the potential to upset the relationship between 
national courts and the European Court of Human Rights and to present an obstacle to the 
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effective discharge of the courts’ obligations under the HRA.  In short, the deficiencies of this 
overarching construction of the HRA are significant.   
 
The Practical Inadequacy of the Mirror Model 
In the context of individual judicial decisions, there may well be salient reasons underpinning 
reliance on a relevant Strasbourg decision or decisions and/or the endorsement by a domestic 
court that the standard of protection afforded by the European Court of Human Rights should 
be co-terminus with the level of protections afforded under the HRA.  The utility of this 
presumption should not, however, be stretched unduly.  During the parliamentary debates on 
the Human Rights Bill—while acknowledging that relevant jurisprudence and principles 
would generally be applied by domestic courts
68—Lord Irvine was careful to remind that 
Strasbourg authority could not be presumed to be directly-applicable in the domestic context:  
  
Should a United Kingdom court ever have a case before it which is a precise mirror of 
one that has been previously considered by the European Court of Human Rights, 
which I doubt, it may be appropriate for it to apply the European Court’s findings 
directly to that case; but in real life cases are rarely as neat and tidy.
69
  
  
Lord Irvine’s concern—subsequently reflected in the House of Lords decision in Gillan70—is 
revealing of a central weakness of the mirror metaphor; it relies on the false premise that 
Strasbourg jurisprudence is both suitable to be directly applied in a precedential manner and 
that it contains all the answers to the difficult questions that routinely arise at the domestic 
level.  Each of these assumptions is open to question.   
 
The particular characteristics of the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
Early in the life of the HRA, Sir John Laws cautioned against the unquestioning adoption and 
application by domestic courts of the Strasbourg jurisprudence; the English court, he argued, 
should not be regarded as a “Strasbourg surrogate”71 whose job is to simply “add on the 
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Strasbourg learning to the corpus of English law.”72  The distinctive characteristics of the 
Strasbourg case-law present a range of difficulties for courts seeking to extract and apply 
Convention norms in the domestic context.
73
  Three practical problems can be briefly 
highlighted.   
First, the fact that the jurisprudence of the European Court is declaratory in nature—
being indicative of a breach (or otherwise) of the Convention rather than specifying a 
particular course of remedial action—makes its application in the domestic context 
contingent on a degree of creativity on the part of national authorities, the courts included.  
As the Convention organs are “not seeking to harmonise constitutional traditions”74 member 
states are free to determine the method of achieving compatibility in accordance with the 
rules of their national legal system in response to a finding by the European Court of a 
breach.
75
  It is not an objective of the Convention system to supplant protections for legal 
rights already existent in the national system, but to re-enforce them.  That the HRA was 
designed to be consistent with this notion is evident from the inclusion of s.11, which 
indicates that the rights available under the HRA should run in parallel with those already 
operative in domestic law.   
Secondly, the promotion of a regimented relationship between domestic law, and the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights—by definition a “shifting”76 body of 
law which feeds on developments at the national level
77—is not without difficulty; decisions 
of the European Court of Human Rights might, over the course of time, be superseded by 
jurisprudential developments and therefore inapt to be followed or applied in any way.
78
  
Finally, the fact that the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights is directed 
towards multiple jurisdictions and, in turn, has given rise to the margin of appreciation, raises 
concerns relating to the transferability of findings of the Strasbourg court between member 
states.  Decisions in which the European Court of Human Rights has invoked the margin of 
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appreciation are—for instance—heavily conditioned by factors prevalent in the respondent 
state and should not be assumed to be directly applicable elsewhere.   
Each of these distinctive characteristics of the Strasbourg case law points towards the 
conclusion that the processes of integrating the Convention jurisprudence into the existing 
body of domestic common and statute law is therefore—or should be—far from a 
straightforward task.
79
  In addition to addressing questions of practical and temporal 
relevance and applicability, domestic courts should actively “take into account” the 
jurisdictional, fact-sensitive and declaratory dimensions of potentially applicable European 
Court decisions in order to fashion a coherent reading of the requirements of the Convention.  
It is from this basis that a court’s subsequent assessment of how, or whether, this reading can 
be given effect to—and set a domestic precedent—via the HRA should proceed.  The central 
weakness of the mirror model of interpretation is that this complex process of reconciliation 
is distilled into a series of binary questions—of whether to straightforwardly follow or not, of 
how to provide “no less” but “no more” protection than Strasbourg—that cannot provide 
coherent responses to the more difficult questions posed by the courts’ attempts to give effect 
to their obligations under the HRA.  A series of examples will illustrate this point in practice.   
 
Unclear authority and the mirror model 
While the mirror model might be argued to provide reinforce the reasoning of domestic 
courts where clear and constant authority can be relied upon, at the level of individual judicial 
decision-making an overly-rigid adherence to the mirror ideal holds the potential to exercise a 
disempowering effect on the ability of courts to provide a remedy or adequate answer to the 
legal problem arising.  The response of the House of Lords to those areas in which clear 
guiding authority at the Strasbourg level has been lacking demonstrates the inability of the 
mirror approach to provide an adequate framework from which judicial analysis can proceed.  
In the House of Lords decision in N v Secretary of State for the Home Department, for 
example, the Law Lords’ survey of the Strasbourg jurisprudence concluded that the relevant 
authority was “not in an altogether satisfactory state”, lacked “its customary clarity” and 
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displayed evidence of reasoning that was not “entirely convincing.”80  Yet, as Lord Hope 
argued:  
 
Our task, then, is to analyse the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court and, having 
done so and identified its limits, to apply it to the facts of this case … It is not for us 
to search for a solution … which is not to be found in the Strasbourg case law.  It is 
for the Strasbourg court, not for us, to decide whether its case law is out of touch with 
modern conditions and to determine what further extensions, if any, are needed to the 
rights guaranteed by the Convention.  We must take the case law as we find it, not as 
we would like it to be.
81
  
 
The apparent consequence of this particular dynamic of the mirror model is to either require 
the perceived deficiencies of the Strasbourg case-law to be replicated, or otherwise leave the 
domestic court powerless to take remedial action in translating the relevant authority into the 
domestic setting.   
Where a domestic court is confronted with an issue on which no relevant Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is available, the House of Lords has indicated that a measure of “self-restraint” 
is required, “lest we stretch our own jurisprudence beyond that which is shared by all the 
states parties to the Convention.”82  Such a view is grounded in the view that the meaning of 
the Convention should be uniform throughout the Council of Europe, and that the HRA rights 
merely replicate those rights enforced by the European Court of Human Rights.  While 
defended on grounds of respect for the European Court of Human Rights as the ultimate 
interpreter of the Convention standards,
83
 this particular aspect of the mirror model holds the 
potential to preclude domestic courts from providing adequate responses to the legal 
questions arising before them.  The suggestion that the courts should approach those areas in 
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which clear Strasbourg authority is lacking as “no go areas”84 tantamount to being non-
justiciable has provoked Lord Kerr to lament the “Ullah-type reticence” under which “it is 
not only considered wrong to attempt to anticipate developments at the supra national level of 
the Strasbourg court, but … that we should not go where Strasbourg has not yet gone.”85  In 
the Supreme Court decision in Ambrose v Harris Lord Kerr argued:  
 
… it is the duty of this and every court not only to ascertain “where the jurisprudence 
of the Strasbourg court clearly shows that it currently stands” but to resolve the 
question of whether a claim to a Convention right is viable or not, even where the 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court does not disclose a clear current view.
86
 
 
The HRA conclusively put paid to the suggestion that questions relating to the Convention 
Rights fell outside the competence of the domestic judiciary;
87
 it would be an unusual result 
of the implementation of the HRA if it were to perpetuate argument that Convention issues 
are effectively non-justiciable in those areas where no directly-applicable Strasbourg 
authority is available.    
 
Conflicting authority and the mirror model 
Nor can the mirror model of interpretation provide an adequate explanation of how courts 
should respond to conflicting Strasbourg case-law.  In the case of Animal Defenders 
International the House of Lords was asked to adjudicate on the compatibility of the 
prohibition on political advertising in s.321(2) of the Communications Act 2003 with the 
Article 10 right to freedom of expression.  Two potentially applicable decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights were raised in argument.  The first of these—VgT Verein 
gegen Tierfabricken v Switzerland
88—provided authority for the suggestion that a blanket ban 
on advertising for political ends would be a disproportionate interference with freedom of 
expression.  The second—Murphy v Ireland89—suggested that a restriction on advertising for 
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religious purposes would fall within the range of reasonable responses available to states 
under the margin of appreciation doctrine.   
In declining to grant the declaration of incompatibility requested by the applicants, the 
House of Lords opted to place reliance on Murphy v Ireland, which—given that its subject 
matter was a prohibition on religious advertising—was arguably the less factually relevant of 
the two decisions.  The Law Lords used Murphy to illustrate that a consensus amongst the 
contracting states was lacking, and that—as a result—a margin of appreciation would be 
afforded to the regulatory decisions of national authorities in this field.  On the basis of this 
supposed margin of appreciation, the Law Lords were able to find that “great weight”90 
should be attributed to Parliament’s decision to ban political advertising in full knowledge of 
the potential inconsistency of the prohibition with at least one decision of the European Court 
of Human Rights.  In this latter respect at least, the decision of the House of Lords is almost 
certainly correct; the HRA places no bar on Parliament legislating in a way which is 
potentially inconsistent with “the Convention Rights.”  Yet in order to reach this point—
hamstrung by their own presumption in favour of the application of relevant and clear 
authority—the Law Lords reasoning provides an unconvincing defence of why the clear and 
relevant decision in VgT—arising on facts which, as Lord Bingham acknowledged, were 
“very similar to those in the present case”91 —was not followed.  On its face, s.2(1) provides 
courts with the flexibility needed to consider and weigh up the merits of potentially 
conflicting Strasbourg authority, permitting courts to assess the relevancy of potentially 
applicable—and potentially contradictory—decisions.  The rudimentary questions posed by 
the mirror model of interpretation, in this instance, proved unable to underpin a coherent 
judicial response.   
 
The Increasing Inaccuracy of the Mirror Metaphor 
The case against the perpetuation of the mirror model becomes more compelling when 
account is taken of the increasing evidence illustrating further departures from the notion that 
the Strasbourg and domestic protections should mirror each other in both form and substance.  
That many of these departures cannot be explained by reference to the so-called exceptions to 
the principle indicates that to speak of domestic law as straightforwardly replicating the 
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requirements of the Convention provides an inaccurate encapsulation of the processes of 
judicial reasoning—and their outcomes—in HRA adjudication.  In this sense, the mirror 
principle unfairly implies an uncritical attitude to the Strasbourg authority that is largely 
absent from the recent record of the courts under the HRA.  While AF demonstrates that the 
precedential weight of a decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights remains considerable,
92
 Horncastle confirms that such authority—even “a clear 
statement of principle … in respect of the precise issue” before the domestic court—will not 
be regarded as being determinative as a matter of course.
93
  But a focus on such cases—
where the requirements of, and exceptions to, the presumption in favour of adherence to 
Strasbourg authority are explicit considerations—distracts from a crucial point; that the stated 
exceptions to the mirror model of interpretation are unequal to the task of facilitating the 
ordered reconciliation of domestic and Strasbourg authority.    
 
Limited Authority and the mirror model 
The impossibility of sustaining an adherence to the mirror principle becomes most obvious in 
those areas in which domestic courts are operating within a context where the relevant and 
applicable Convention jurisprudence provides only partial support for the decision eventually 
taken.  While a strict adherence to the mirror model would not seem to sanction building on, 
or developing, nominally applicable—though insubstantial—authority,94 notable examples 
exist of domestic courts pursuing exactly this type of creative reasoning.  In the House of 
Lords decision in Limbuela, the “only approximately relevant authority”95 at the Strasbourg 
level was the admissibility decision in O’Rourke v United Kingdom.96  The treatment, by the 
European Court of Human Rights, of the relevant law in O’Rourke runs to a mere four 
paragraphs, yet on the basis of that slight authority the House of Lords was not only able to 
fashion a remedy, but was able to arguably extend the scope of protection offered by Article 
3 of the Convention in the domestic context in so doing.
97
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Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers provides a further illustration of exactly the 
type of progressive judicial reasoning that a strictly-construed mirror principle would 
apparently preclude.  Prior to the decision in Campbell, the question of whether the 
Convention required member states to make available remedies for breaches of Article 8 
caused by private persons was a “difficult question” to which  “Strasbourg case law 
provide[d] no definitive answer.”98  While the decision of the European Court of Human Rights 
in Peck v United Kingdom
99
 had concerned the interference with Article 8 rights by the state, the 
only relevant decision on the particular horizontal application of Article 8 was in the form of the 
admissibility decision of Spencer v United Kingdom.
100
  Yet in Campbell the House of Lords 
was, by a majority, able to find that the requirements of the Convention Rights were such that a 
remedies should be made available, in advance of a conclusive decision on point from the 
European Court of Human Rights.
101
   
In both Limbuela and Campbell, the available Strasbourg authority provided only 
limited support for the decision taken by the House of Lords, in both the Law Lords were 
able to resolve questions of law to which the Strasbourg jurisprudence provided no complete 
answer.
102
  Such decisions are, of course, entirely consonant with the incrementally 
progressive approach of the common law court and serve to highlight the fact that ultimately 
the strict requirements of the mirror model of interpretation are inconsistent with the limited 
creative role that is afforded to courts by the constitution.
103
   
 
The integration of Convention and Common Law 
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In those areas in which the common law and the Convention run in train, the mirror metaphor 
again oversimplifies the processes of reconciling the demands of the Convention rights with 
established doctrines, both as a matter of substance and of judicial technique.  A strict 
adherence to the mirror principle would see established domestic principles overridden in the 
name of replicating the Strasbourg rights at the national level.  Yet the character of the 
common law has, for the most part, been preserved rather than usurped by the application of 
“the Convention rights.”104  Even in that area of the common law where the influence of the 
Convention has been most palpable—the protection of personal privacy—change has been 
both incremental and arguably not fully reflective of the protections offered by the European 
Court of Human Rights.  The development of the action of breach of confidence has certainly 
been marked—and clearly driven by the perceived requirements of Articles 8 and 10 of the 
Convention—but it is notable also for highlighting a series of inaccuracies relating to the so-
called mirror principle.   
While courts have sought to give effect to the requirements of Article 8 (and indeed 
Article 10) in the domestic context, domestic courts have consciously avoided declaring that 
the HRA requires the creation of a free-standing action for infringement of personal 
privacy.
105
  Instead, a recalibrated breach of confidence doctrine has been the vehicle by 
which the Convention standards have been transferred into domestic law.  This cause of 
action has, in the words of one commentator, developed to “precisely mirror” the protections 
for personal information found in Article 8 of the Convention.
106
  Yet, on closer inspection, 
the relationship between domestic privacy protections and those provided by the Convention 
has not been as neat and tidy as this assessment would immediately suggest.  In the first 
instance, early decisions on breach of confidence eschewed application of the Article 8 case-
law and saw the adoption of a test of offensiveness originating in the decision of the 
Australian High Court decision of Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game 
Meats.
107
  Domestic courts “took their lead” not from Strasbourg, but from a comparable 
common law jurisdiction.  More recent decisions demonstrate an equally uneven record.  We 
have already seen that in one sense the House of Lords decision in Campbell v MGN pre-
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empted the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Von Hannover v Germany, 
yet it is also arguably the case that another aspect of that case—the expansive reading of 
Article 8 adopted by the European Court—has not been fully embraced by domestic courts.108   
The public law sphere provides further examples of the inability of the mirror 
metaphor to accurately encapsulate developments since the enactment of the HRA, with the 
integration of proportionality into English public law providing a useful illustration.  
Determining whether a given restriction on a qualified right satisfies the Convention 
requirements of necessity and proportionality cannot be coherently informed by the objective 
of mirroring the perceived requirements of the Strasbourg case law.  In this regard the text of 
the Convention can at best provide a series of analytical questions from which domestic 
judicial inquiry can proceed; is the contested limitation prescribed by law?  Is it in pursuance 
of a legitimate aim?  The Strasbourg case law cannot provide answers to these questions in 
the abstract.  Instead domestic courts are required to make their own assessment of concepts 
such whether the limitation answers a “pressing social need” and whether it is “necessary in a 
democratic society.”109  Answers to these questions are, of course, heavily contextual.  The 
Convention and its case law can only provide a framework around which a domestic court 
might structure its decision-making process.  Yet even in this role, the Convention 
jurisprudence has proved only to be of limited assistance. 
 As a result of the failure of the European Court of Human Rights to articulate a 
consistent, structured, approach to questions of proportionality,
110
 domestic courts have 
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sought guidance from elsewhere.  The leading House of Lords case of R. (on the application 
of Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
111
 saw Convention authority rejected 
in favour of the test of proportionality adopted by the Privy Council in de Freitas.
112
  Daly—
itself a case concerning rights existent at common law—saw the de Freitas test endorsed as 
the appropriate standard of review in adjudication concerning the Convention rights and has 
been endorsed as such in subsequent decisions.
113
  While the post-HRA standard of review 
employed by domestic law might well be broadly consistent with the expectations of the 
European Court,
114
 the techniques employed to achieve this consistency—in particular in 
drawing on and incrementally refining Commonwealth and other jurisprudence from beyond 
the Convention system
115—more in common with the established techniques of common law 
development than with any attempted mirroring of Strasbourg case law in the domestic 
context.
116
   
 
The reasonably-foreseeable development 
While initial indications suggested that it was not for courts to “pre-empt”117 Strasbourg 
where a domestic court suspected that a European Court of Human Rights decision was 
outdated, out of line with the emerging European consensus, or failed to fully resolve the 
issue to be determined, recent cases have indicated a subtle change of direction.  The 
possibility of the courts using their limited creative powers to engineer a “reasonably 
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foreseeable” development of the law in this regard was raised obliquely in the speech of 
Baroness Hale in Gentle: 
 
Parliament is free to go further than Strasbourg if it wishes, but we are not free to foist 
upon Parliament or upon public authorities an interpretation of a Convention right 
which goes way beyond anything which we can reasonably foresee that Strasbourg 
might do.
118
   
 
While at pains to stress the institutional competence issues in such a proposed development, 
Baroness Hale’s careful use of hyperbole does appear to suggest that it may well be open to 
courts to put forward an interpretation of a Convention right which incrementally develops, in 
a reasonably foreseeable way, pre-existing Strasbourg case-law.
119
   
 Predictive reasoning of this sort was in evidence in the decision of the House of Lords 
in Re P.
120
  Re P has been hailed as confirming an exception to the mirror principle in those 
areas where the European Court has held that the margin of appreciation applies,
121
 it also 
provides evidence of the highest court engaging in a degree of overt speculation over how—if 
confronted with a similar case—the European Court of Human Rights might respond.122  
While such decisions might be presented as a pragmatic domestic response to areas of 
uncertainty within the Convention jurisprudence consistent with the general principle in 
favour of applying relevant Strasbourg authority,
123
 they appear to depart from the suggestion 
that it is not for domestic courts to provide answers to legal problems which cannot be found 
in the Strasbourg case-law.
124
  Questions of institutional competence are central to this 
particular inquiry, with the creative abilities of the courts—the power of the courts to 
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generate outcomes that are respectful of, though not strictly mandated by, the Convention 
jurisprudence—arguably greater in those areas of domestic law where the common law 
applies or those areas where the influence of the Convention is conditioned by a margin of 
appreciation.  So long as those creative powers are exercised compatibly with the tenor of the 
Strasbourg case law,
125
 and with the incremental law-making powers bestowed upon judges 
by the constitution,
126
 s.2(1) imposes no bar on their use.     
 
Conclusion—The False Premise of the Bill of Rights Debate? 
The mirror principle remains a paradox at the heart of the judicial approach to the 
interpretation and application of the HRA.  The highest courts have consistently pronounced 
the HRA to be a constitutional measure, requiring ‘generous and purposive interpretation.’127  
Simultaneously, the mirror metaphor—emerging out of a constraining reading of s.2(1) and 
of the HRA itself—has presented a quiet, formalist, obstacle to the effective realisation of this 
lofty ambition.  As we have seen however, the notion that domestic protections should mirror 
their Strasbourg counterparts is flawed, both constitutionally and practically; with the mirror 
metaphor reflecting an overly narrow interpretation of the HRA and proving in its 
implementation unequal to the task of permitting the orderly transition of Strasbourg 
authority into domestic law.  The principles of interpretation associated with the mirror 
principle can, at best, provide only a basic explanation of the reasoning processes that have 
sought to give effect to the substantive protections afforded by the HRA.  The binary 
distinctions that are at its core—to follow or not; to do no less, but no more, than the 
Convention jurisprudence requires—cannot provide adequate responses to the complex 
processes of reconciling the demands of the Convention Rights with domestic statute and 
common law.  Increasingly, signs are visible that the strictures imposed by the mirror model 
of interpretation are loosening, and that an approach to the meaning of the “Convention 
rights” which is consonant with the domestic separation of powers—and therefore recognises 
the legitimacy of the limited definitional role played courts in giving meaning to those 
rights—is beginning to gain credence.  As a result, the evidence in favour of the slow 
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emergence of a distinctly domestic body of human rights law is a more tenable suggestion 
than the straightforward reflection of the mirror metaphor would have us believe.    
 Yet the political currency of the mirror principle remains well-established.  The 
perception that domestic courts are inflexibly bound to adhere to the rulings of the European 
Court of Human Rights continues to manifest itself in the debates on whether a national Bill 
of Rights might be more responsive to ‘British’ rights than the HRA,128 and has undoubtedly 
fuelled calls for the United Kingdom to extract itself from the Convention system in order to 
escape what have been referred to by one former Law Lord as the ‘occasional extravagances 
of the Strasbourg Court.’129  The Conservative drive to repeal the HRA, or to replace it with a 
more non-European rights instrument, is therefore premised in part on continued influence 
and acceptance of the mirror metaphor and the parallel suggestion that domestic institutions 
are rendered ‘subservient’130 to the European Court of Human Rights through the combined 
efforts of the Convention system and the HRA.  It would be unfortunate to say the least if, in 
spite of the increasing evidence in favour of the dilution of the mirror principle, continued 
perceptions of rigidity and undue deference to Strasbourg contributed to the premature 
demise of the HRA.    
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